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Engineering Risk Assessment
Space Mission, Campaign & 
System Risk Analyses
• Ares V Mars campaign
• CxAT Lunar Surface Systems
• HEFT II campaign to a NEO
• Aquila II
• SWORDS
Agency Risk Methodology & 
Requirements Development
• Liquid/Solid Propellant Study for 
NASA’s Study of Rockets
• CCP requirements development
• OSMA PRA guide chapters and 
training modules.
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U.S.	launches	with	liquid	stage	
failures
all	types
process
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unknown
weather
LV	with	at	least	1	LRE
Asteroid Threat Assessment 
Project (ATAP)
• Physics-based impact risk model
• Fragmentation/breakup
• Crater-forming impact
• Ground damage assessment
Characterization
Entry &
Breakup
Blast 
Propagation
Ground 
Damage
Crew Launch Vehicle Risk Assessment 
& Risk-Informed Design
• Ares I/V integrated LOM/LOC
• SLS abortability
• SNC Dream Chaser mission risk modeling
• SpaceX DragonRider ascent risk sensitivity
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Example Architecture
Nominal
Abort
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Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling
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Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling
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Test Case Setup
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Test Case: 4 Engines + Tanks
• Simple engine model for generic 
launch vehicle platform 
(derived from J2X)
• 32 components: 7 per engine and 
4 tanks
•Main combustion chamber (MCC)
•2 turbopumps: fuel (FTP)
and oxidizer (OTP)
•3 pipes (fuel, oxidizer, hot gas)
•Nozzle
• Between ~1k–6k triangles per 
component
• 3 different initiators: 
MCC, FTP, and OTP
Tank
(2) FTP
(3) OTP
(1) MCC
(4) Nozzle
(5) Pipe 1
(7) Pipe 3
(6) Pipe 2
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Failure Propagation Model
• Models failure propagation of debris field 
and blast wave environments
• Consists of component-to-component 
interactions and behaviors given 
initial conditions
• Uses Monte Carlo framework developed 
in C++:
•Execution begins by seeding a failure and letting 
it cascade until propagation ends
•Results include probabilities of component 
vulnerabilities and scenario tracking
• 100,000 realizations run in ~2 minutes on 
laptop for current test case
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Propagation Example
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Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling
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Vehicle-level Explosion Model II
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Blast Propagation Model
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Blast Propagation Model
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Blast Propagation Model
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Integrated Ascent Risk Modeling
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Structural Response Model
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Debris Model
•Debris propagation
•Three degrees-of-freedom (3DOF) trajectory 
integration using MISSION code
•Trajectories  calculated for:
– Launch vehicle
– Crew module
– Each fragment of potentially dangerous size
• Initial debris conditions
•Mass distribution based on experimental data
•Velocity distribution
– Experimental and historical data
– Computed results
•Debris Impact risk determined from 
intersection of CM and debris 
trajectories
Fragment 
field
Orion position
Debris field caused by fragmentation of 
the Ares I CLV during ascent
Strike probability as a function of 
MET with penetration criterion
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Debris Propagation Model
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Risk Contributors
Many contributors to risk as shown below—too many to exhaustively 
analyze.
!
• Physics-based analysis 
of key risk factors
•External hazards
•Failure environments
• Dynamic nature of 
failures
•Time dependence
•State dependence
• Interactive effects 
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OFF TO THE MOON…
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LSS Background
• In 2004, NASA was chartered 
to return humans to the moon 
and enable long-term 
habitation
•Baseline transportation 
architecture developed during 
the Exploration System 
Architecture Study (ESAS)
•Lunar surface architecture 
concepts developed by Lunar 
Surface Systems (LSS) Project
• Campaigns: 30+ flights 
spanning a decade
• Combined exploration 
architecture driven by safety 
and mission success criteria
What is the probability of 
Loss of Mission (LOM) 
for a lunar campaign?
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•Proposed requirement was to be allocated as reliability 
requirements for Elements
•All systems required to “not fail” over duration
•Approach
•Countered with Availability requirement proposal
•Used sensitivity to scope potential ranges
Lunar Base Loss of Mission
What is the probability of Loss of 
Mission over a lunar campaign?
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Notional Lunar Mission
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Lunar Surface 
Systems
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Lunar Surface Systems
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Mission Success Metrics
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Integrated LSS Risk Modeling
Element Reliability Data
(Initiator Likelihoods)Nominal Manifest 
& Activity Timeline
Dynamic Risk 
Simulation Model
Dynamic, 
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Outpost Availability Sensitivity 
Study
• Model availability as functional 
capabilities within a system
•Multiple suppliers exist from a 
collection of outpost elements
•Pooled capabilities
• Failures go offline and 
successful repair modeled as a 
function of limited resources
•Available repair mass
•Available resources (crew 
presence, EVA time available)
• Sensitivity to understand levels 
needed
Repair assumption plays an 
increasingly larger role over time
What happens with limited 
resupply and repairability?
Average “complete” 
availability days, as a 
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Functional Availability: 
Environmental Protection
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RETURN TO EARTH
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Reentry Risk from Orbital Debris 
Strike
• What can occur?
•Orbital debris (OD) strike damages thermal protection system (TPS) 
of spacecraft prior to reentry
• What is the severity?
– Compromised TPS may: 
• Increase aeroheating
• Fail to keep substructure 
temperature within safe limits
• Cause structural failure and 
loss of crew (LOC)
• How likely is this outcome?
– Depends on:
• Likelihood of OD strike
• Degree of TPS loss from strike
• Degree of aeroheating
increase
• Margins in TPS and structure
• Dispersions / uncertainties in 
trajectory, aeroheating, TPS, 
and substructure 
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Physics-Based Risk Assessment
Reentry 
Physics 
and 
Spacecraft
Response
Structural 
Failure
Criterion
Environments and 
Vehicle States
OD Strike —
TPS Damage
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Reentry Risk Framework with OD 
Strike 
Aerothermal
Performance
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Page 33
OD Strike Modeling
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Thermal Protection System Impact
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Uncertainty in Reentry Risk 
Assessment
•Sources of uncertainties
•Orbital debris: OD Environments 
and damage likely to be caused
•Trajectory, aerothermal, TPS, 
structural analysis
– Initial conditions
– Atmospheric properties
– Vehicle state and performance
– Structural geometry and material 
properties
– Models (trajectory, aerothermal, 
TPS) and model parameters
•Assessment must carry 
uncertainty through the model
σsubstructure
σstengthPr
σ
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Approach Application
• Risk-informed decision 
support
•Requirement verification
•Design optimization
•Selection/procurement
• Risk analysis is 
informative, not 
predictive
•Provides quantitative 
answers to specific 
questions
•Always driven by specific 
application
•Based on traditional 
methods and extended as 
appropriate
Pessimistic 
bounds
Architecture Model inputs
Physical model
Assess risk 
drivers
Risk 
acceptable?
Solution 
reached
Assumption 
driven?
Architecture 
driven?
Refine 
inputs
Design trades
Iterative, responsive modeling approach
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FINAL QUESTIONS?
November 2015
